The final phase of the Interregnum makes the last five years of the Conservative government look positively strong and stable. Never mind four prime ministers in five years, what about ten changes of government in twelve months? Traditional accounts of the end of England’s brief experiment with non-monarchical government have presented the rapid regime changes as symptoms of the fundamental failure to find a lasting political settlement to replace the monarchy. According to this argument, all of these regimes suffered from considerable structural weaknesses: they were dependent on the military to keep them in power, but the cost of maintaining a large military establishment placed an enormous strain on the state and a huge tax burden on the public; the regimes struggled for legitimacy and were generally unpopular, especially with England’s traditional elite; England’s rulers were hamstrung by divisions between radicals and conservatives, and between military and civilian factions.

Henry Reece, author of a fine work on the army in Cromwellian England, takes aim at this interpretation. In his compelling and lively study, he argues that the restoration of monarchy was anything but inevitable. Reece employs a similar strategy to that used by the historian David Cressy in his account of the outbreak of the Civil War, England on Edge (2006), ending his narrative before the return of Charles II to encourage the reader to reflect on the alternative outcomes that were possible. He adopts a largely narrative approach, beginning with an overview of events up to the accession of Oliver Cromwell’s son Richard, which will be useful for readers unfamiliar with the history of mid-17th-century England. Reece only departs from this approach in the final two chapters, which review the nature of the press in the period and the strategies adopted by a number of individuals to navigate rapid political changes.

Reece provides a strong challenge to the claim that structural weaknesses were critical in the downfall of the Interregnum regimes. In particular, he disputes the claim that the size of England’s military establishment and the heavy taxation required to sustain it were fundamentally incompatible with stable government. Reece argues that